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Abstract: Controlling the allocation of safety requirements across a system’s architecture from the early 
stages of development is an aspiration embodied in numerous major safety standards. Manual approaches 
of applying this process in practice are ineffective due to the scale and complexity of modern electronic 
systems. In the work presented here, we aim to address this issue by presenting an extension to the 
dependability analysis and optimisation tool, HiP-HOPS, which allows automatic allocation of such 
requirements. We focus on aerospace requirements expressed as Development Assurance Levels (DALs); 
however, the proposed process and algorithms can be applied to other common forms of expression of 
safety requirements such as Safety Integrity Levels. We illustrate application to a model of an aircraft 
wheel braking system.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At the early stages of systems engineering, requirement 
identification and allocation is crucial in driving the 
development correctly and efficiently towards a timely, cost-
effective project completion. Indeed, changes in requirements 
which occur late in the development lifecycle incur much 
greater costs to implement (Sharif, et al., 2012). Therefore, to 
minimize the impact of these changes on the project’s 
schedule and budget, it is important to employ an effective 
requirements engineering methodology. In the case of safety 
critical systems, an effective determination and distribution 
of safety requirements is the basis of the development process 
recommended by numerous safety standards. Specifically, the 
concept of Safety Integrity Levels (SILs), first introduced in 
the IEC61508 (SC 65-A, 2010) standard, provides a means of 
describing, summarizing and assigning such requirements 
across the system. This concept is shared across numerous 
domain-specific standards such as ISO26262 (TC 22/SC3, 
2011) for the automotive industry and ARP4754A (S-18, 
SAE, 2010) for the aerospace industry. 
Manual methods have been employed widely in the past to 
deal with various phases of development, including 
requirements engineering. However, as the scale and 
complexity of subject systems grow, such approaches 
inevitably become ineffective and a potential liability against 
a project’s completion. For instance, in the case of allocating 
SILs, determining an appropriate allocation might require 
evaluating hundreds of thousands of possibilities, each of 
which has a potentially different impact in terms of 
development time and effort required to implement. Note that 
many of those options which are often chosen in practice are 
non-optimal incurring unnecessary costs. Obviously, a 
process of exhaustive evaluation of all options would incur a 
prohibitive cost for most projects of non-trivial scale. By 
introducing tool support to specific development processes, 
such as requirements allocation, a high degree of automation 
can be achieved and costs alleviated. Automation would 
allow the development effort to be directed towards tackling 
more important, higher-level development issues, freeing up 
precious development resources. It also provides the 
opportunity to repeat the process efficiently, if required, as 
part of subsequent development iterations. 
Recently, work has enabled automatic SIL allocation from 
system models annotated with failure logic in (Azevedo, et 
al., 2014) and DAL allocation from minimum cut sets in 
(Bieber, et al., 2011). In this paper, we describe a further 
development of this work to provide robust support within 
the HiP-HOPS tool for model-based automatic allocation of 
aerospace safety requirements in the form of DALs. The 
work is different from that described in (Bieber, et al., 2011) 
because our starting point is not a minimum cut set list but 
the system model. Furthermore, we use meta-heuristics, 
specifically Tabu Search, as a basis for obtaining optimal 
requirement allocations.  
1.1 A summary of Development Assurance Levels 
ARP4754A (henceforth referred to as ‘the standard’) 
provides guidelines towards the development of civil aircraft 
and is employed internationally. Its recommended 
methodology describes a set of safety assessment processes, 
which are designed to be carried out in parallel to a typical 
system development lifecycle. By performing the activities 
required by these processes, with the specified level of rigor, 
the system can be certified to meet its regulatory 
requirements. Development Assurance Levels (DALs) are the 
aerospace equivalent to SILs and are central to the 
  
     
 
assessment framework described by the standard. DALs are 
meant to represent the ‘level of rigor’ (ARP4754A, 2010, p. 
11) which safety assessment activities are required to be 
performed with. To understand the importance of DALs in 
the safety assessment process, it is necessary to outline the 
standard’s view of a system’s architecture. 
The model upon which the standard bases its 
recommendations divides the system’s architectural elements 
into three categories: functions, systems and items. Functions 
represent a high-level view of the system’s functionality. For 
example, a likely function in any aircraft would be ‘Flight 
Control’. Systems are an abstraction level immediately below 
functions, with each system providing, either on its own or 
with other systems, the behaviour described by a function; 
e.g. a ‘Wheel Braking System’ could support the ‘Braking’ 
function. Finally, items represent the lower-levels of the  
architecture, i.e., hardware or software components or small 
size sub-systems. 
The initial assignment of DALs to functions occurs early in 
the development lifecycle, during the Aircraft Functional 
Hazard Assessment (FHA). The FHA is the first major stage 
in safety assessment and is more commonly known as 
Functional Hazard Analysis (ARP4754A, pg.12, 2010). This 
analysis identifies the potential Failure Conditions (FC) 
associated with each function, i.e., undesirable events that 
could occur during operation and that compromise the 
aircraft’s safety. Each FC has a severity classification, 
stemming from its impact in the worst possible case, and an 
estimated probability of occurrence. During the Preliminary 
Aircraft Safety Assessment process, DALs are assigned 
based on each Function’s hazard severity (ARP4761, pg.43, 
1996), as seen in Table 1. 
Table 1.  DAL to Severity correspondence 
Severity DAL 
Catastrophic A = 4 
Hazardous / Severe - Major B = 3 
Major C = 2 
Minor D = 1 
No Safety Effect E = 0 
Once DALs have been assigned to functions, and an 
architecture for the system has been defined, DALs are 
iteratively assigned to more refined architectural elements. 
The rules that guide the process of allocation utilize the 
concept of Functional Failure Sets (FFS). FFS contain the 
minimum combinations of function, system or item failures, 
termed Functional Failures (FF) in the standard, which are 
necessary and sufficient to cause a failure of the system 
containing said architectural elements (ARP4754A, pg.11, 
2010). They are assigned with the DALs of the system failure 
they originate from. In turn, items whose failures belong to a 
given FFS can be, in principle, immediately allocated with its 
DAL. However, the standard allows for some items to receive 
less stringent DAL allocations. There are two options in 
doing so. Given a FFS with a DAL of k: 
Option 1: a singular member is assigned a DAL of at least k 
and the other members of at least k-2. 
Option 2: two members are assigned a DAL of at least k-1 
and the other members of at least k-2. 
In the case of a FFS with only one member, option 1 is  
taken. 
The allocation rules effectively state that in a set of items 
which, by failing together, cause a system failure, either one 
of the items must be developed at the system DAL with the 
rest developed at two DALs below, or two items must be 
developed one DAL below the system DAL with the rest 
developed two DALs below system DAL. 
1.2 The issue of Independence in ARP4754A 
In the standard, the concept of “Independence” is said to be 
‘a fundamental attribute to consider when assigning 
Development Assurance Levels’ (ARP4754A, pg. 41, 2010). 
The standard uses independence as an attribute aiming to 
address the issue of common mode errors, which occur due to 
shared requirements amongst Functions or development 
processes amongst Items. It is important to explain our views 
on this matter and how we treat dependence and 
independence in the approach presented here.  
The standard introduces two forms of independence, 
Functional and Item independence. The former refers to the 
presence of common causes of failure between separate 
Functions or Systems of the architecture, while the latter 
refers to separate Items. In both cases, identification of such 
common causes falls within the purview of the 
Aircraft/System Common Cause Analysis (CCA) process. 
The CCA process identifies such causes and includes them in 
the failure analyses performed at subsequent stages such as 
fault tree analysis.  
In HiP-HOPS common causes are treated in two ways. They 
can be explicitly specified in the components and cause, via 
propagation of common energy, material or data errors, 
failure of more than one element in system models. Examples 
of such common causes are common power supplies or data 
sources that affect more than one element. Implicit common 
causes are events such as flood and fire which are typically 
examined in zonal analysis. They can also be specified at the 
model level and trigger simultaneous failure of more than one 
function or components directly and without explicit 
propagation of errors through the architecture. If the failure 
analysis determines that such failures indeed contribute 
towards the failure of seemingly independent Items, Systems 
or Functions, they will accordingly affect the DAL allocation 
to these elements. Therefore, our method correctly allocates 
DALs while addressing the issue of independence taking 
simultaneously into account all possible sources of failure in 
the system. 
1.3 Challenges in requirements allocation 
The allocation of a specific DAL (or SIL or similar safety 
requirement) to a function or item typically implies a 
development cost. Higher DALs imply a higher level of 
rigour and more costly development and assurance activities. 
This is clear in the standards where it is possible to observe, 
for instance, that the higher the DAL for a software item, the 
  
     
 
higher the number of assurance objectives that must be met 
(Nordhoff, p. 7). It is apparent that allocation schemes which 
can achieve the required integrity for the system by assigning 
lower DALs to more items would be more economical and 
translate into less effort and time spent on assurance 
activities. It is precisely those cost-optimal allocations that 
one is interested in finding during the refinement of a system 
architecture under design. This problem can be more formally 
defined as a constrained optimization problem, with the 
decision variables being the DALs of each item; the 
constraints being the rules of allocation defined in the 
standard; and the objective of the optimization being to 
minimize the overall cost imposed by the allocation on the 
development process. This description can be summarized in 
the following expressions: 
      
 
         
 
   
 
Where 
  : the i-th allocated item DAL across all functions 
Cost: the cost function, assigning each DAL a specific cost 
We attempt to identify the allocation of item DALs across all 
functions which minimizes the total cost impact, subject to 
the following constraints: 
                                     
Or 
                                        
                 
Where 
   : the i-th allocated item DAL contributing to a function 
with a DAL of k 
  : the set of DALs for items of a function with DAL of k 
The two constraints represent the two options available when 
allocating DALs (see section 1.1). The first constraint ensures 
that one member has a DAL of at least k, as in option 1, 
whereas the second that two members have DALs of at least 
k-1, as in option 2. In both cases, the remaining members 
must have DALs of at least k-2. 
2. AUTOMATIC ALLOCATION OF DEVELOPMENT 
ASSURANCE LEVELS 
2.1 HiP-HOPS 
Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation 
Studies (Papadopoulos, et al., 2011) is a state-of-the-art 
model-based safety analysis software tool that largely 
automates the synthesis of fault trees and FMEAs from 
system models. Model-based development is a design 
paradigm in which the nominal behaviour of a system is 
developed using a common formal or semi-formal model of 
the system to facilitate communication of requirements and 
design between stakeholders in complex development 
processes. Model-based safety analysis extends this paradigm 
by enhancing the nominal behaviour of the system described 
in the model with component failure logic (Sharvia & 
Papadopoulos, 2011). This allows safety analyses to be 
conducted synchronously with the rest of the development 
activities and provide feedback earlier and more efficiently. 
HiP-HOPS requires a model of the system that is annotated 
with local failure logic for each component from which the 
tool then automatically synthesizes fault trees. These fault 
trees represent the failure logic of the system in the form of a 
tree, with the root of the tree being the ‘top event’ 
representing system failure and its leaves being base 
component failures. These are linked through a series of 
logical connectors such as AND and OR gates. Once the fault 
tree synthesis stage is complete, the tool analyzes the trees to 
produce useful safety artefacts, such as the system’s 
Minimum Cut Sets. These sets contain the combinations of 
basic failure events whose occurrence is both necessary and 
sufficient to cause the overall system’s failure. These sets are 
equivalent to the standard’s FFS (ARP574-A, pg.41, 2010), 
therefore we can use them in applying the DAL 
decomposition rules to allocate DALs onto the system’s 
components. A more detailed description of HiP-HOPS can 
be found in (Papadopoulos, et al., 2011). 
2.2 Reduction Stage 
The rules of DAL allocation allow multiple allocation 
possibilities when an FFS has more than one member. In 
large systems, these options can multiply leading to a 
combinatorial explosion. Indeed, in practice, many options 
exist for the allocation of function DALs to items of an 
architecture, often too many to consider exhaustively. The 
process would certainly benefit from an optimization 
algorithm that can efficiently search the large space of 
potential allocations to seek a cost-optimal allocation. We 
present such an algorithm in the next section which benefits 
from a pre-processing step for search space reduction. 
Let us consider the following scenario in which each FFS 
contributes to a different function of DAL A or lower and 
therefore inherit said DAL: 
FFS 1 = { FF1}   
FFS 2 = { FF1, FF2 }   
FFS 2 = { FF2, FF3 }  
FFS 4 = { FF2, FF3, FF4 } 
In this illustrative example, the relative costs implementing 
an element according to the different DALs are introduced in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Example Cost Function 
DAL A B C D E 
Cost 50 40 20 5 0 
 
An interesting phenomenon is occurring in this scenario. 
Each of the sets contain at least one member from a previous 
set and one member from the next, apart from the first and 
last. Additionally, each set only contains one member not 
belonging to a previous set. The cost function itself seen in 
  
     
 
Table 4 is also interesting, as it is strictly increasing with 
regards to the DALs and non-linear.  
Although there are multiple possible optimal solutions, 
finding one in this case does not necessarily involve 
enumerating all options. The solution given in Table 3, for 
instance, can be found using the following reasoning steps:  
 FF1 was assigned A because it belongs to FFS1 and 
is the sole member, therefore inheriting its level. 
 FF2 was assigned C because the other member of 
FFS2 is FF1 and has already been assigned level A, 
thus C is the lowest allowable level. 
 FF3 was assigned A because the other member of 
FFS3 is FF2 and has already been assigned level C. 
Note that assigning FF2 and FF3 level B would 
result in a costlier allocation, due to the cost 
function, as C + A = 70 whereas B + B = 80. This is 
where the nature of the cost function chosen plays a 
particular role. 
 Finally, FF4 was assigned C because another 
member of FFS4, FF3, has already been assigned 
level A. 
Table 3. Example Optimal Allocation 
FF1 FF2 FF3 FF4 Cost 
A C A C 140 
 
Although this reasoning excludes the other possible optimal 
allocation, given in Table 4, it can still lead to an optimal 
solution (as shown) and does not require investigating other 
options that could be derived from the rules.  
Table 4. Alternative Optimal Allocation 
FF1 FF2 FF3 FF4 Cost 
A A C C 140 
 
Let us now try to generalise the above example. Due to the 
high severity of aircraft hazards, the rules for DAL allocation 
are stricter than those found in other standards, allowing 
DAL reduction of only two levels at most. This allows us, 
when a model and the cost function exhibit certain properties, 
to reduce the possible allocations significantly by removing 
inefficient options, in some cases even eliminating all options 
of allocation down to one without loss of optimality. Even 
when there are still options remaining for optimization, the 
search space of the problem has been significantly reduced, 
thereby likely improving the effectiveness of the optimization 
technique employed subsequently. 
These series of allocations can be applied when: 
1) the cost function of each element is non-linear and 
strictly increasing with respect to the DALs of its 
FFs  
2) there exist N FFSs for all of the architecture’s 
effects (N can be less than the total number of FFS 
in the architecture) that, when ordered in descending 
order of their effect’s DAL, exhibit the following 
‘chain’ property: 
Let      of size n be followed by                 
and so on. The chain property holds for these FFSs 
if:  
a) there exists a common FF that belongs to 
both      and        
b)                   , i.e. the difference 
in the cardinality of two neighbouring FFS 
in the chain is maximum one 
3) there exists a FFS amongst those N that satisfies the 
chain property with a single member 
Note that the above heuristic can only apply in analysis of 
simultaneous allocation of more than one function DALs. 
The reason is that, in the case of allocation of a single DAL 
which is done on the basis of analysis of a single fault tree, 
the redundant FFS required to satisfy the chain property have 
already been eliminated during logical reduction of the sets. 
In cases of multiple allocation of DALs, the chain property 
may apply to subsets of the total set of FFS of the system and 
can be used in those cases to fix a subset of allocations in the 
system, thus reducing the overall search space required in 
subsequent optimisation.The pseudo code for this reduction 
stage follows: 
1) sizeCounter = 1 
2) sort all FFSs in descending order of DAL 
3) changesMade = true 
4) while changesMade is true 
a) changesMade = false 
b) foreach FFS k 
i) if sizeCounter = k.size then: 
(1) if there is just one Member in k unassigned, 
then: 
(a) assign it the lowest possible DAL 
(b) changesMade = true 
(2) end if 
ii) end if 
c) end foreach 
d) increment sizeCounter 
5) end while 
2.3 Tabu Search 
There is a range of optimization algorithms that could be 
adapted to solve the DAL allocation problem. We chose Tabu 
Search (Glover, 1986) for this study as a good candidate as it 
has already shown good performance in earlier work in 
allocation of automotive requirements (Azevedo, et al., 
2013). Tabu search is a meta-heuristic optimization 
technique, which owes its name to its memory structures, 
used to store recently evaluated candidate solutions. The 
candidates stored in these structures are not eligible for 
generation of further candidates and are thereby considered 
‘Tabu’ by the algorithm. The memory artefacts allow for the 
technique to trade space for time and therefore accelerate the 
search for the optimal solution. We have implemented a basic 
  
     
 
version of Tabu Search; each candidate is an allocation of 
DALs over all FFs and the best candidates are those with the 
lowest overall DAL cost. Candidates recently chosen and 
therefore Tabu are stored on the short-term memory structure, 
the ‘Tenure’. An Aspiration Criterion is employed, allowing 
a candidate to be chosen despite being Tabu. The chosen 
criterion requires the candidate allocation to beat the 
Tenure’s current best candidate in terms of overall DAL cost, 
thus being the best (i.e. cheapest) allocation in recent 
memory. The search method used to generate the next set of 
candidates produces a new candidate for each allocation of 
the current one that can be changed and not violate DAL 
decomposition rules. This means that allocations assigned by 
the reduction stage cannot be reduced in DAL under the level 
they were then assigned, only increased. The algorithm for 
Tabu Search follows: 
1) Generate a random allocation 
2) Set random allocation as the current choice 
3) Add the current choice to Tabu Tenure 
4) Repeat until iteration count or time limit are reached 
i) Produce random alternative allocations from the 
current choice 
ii) Sort the produced allocations by DAL cost, 
ascending 
iii) Select the lowest cost allocation as the next choice 
iv) Repeat until a next choice has been selected or all 
alternative allocations have been examined 
(1) If the next choice is not Tabu, select it to be the 
next choice 
(2) If it is Tabu but aspiring, select it to be the next 
choice 
(3) Otherwise, examine the next produced choice 
v) If none of the produced allocations is either non- 
Tabu or aspiring, set the lowest cost one as the next 
choice 
5) The next choice becomes the current choice 
6) Add the current choice to the Tabu Tenure 
7) Sort the Tabu Tenure by DAL cost, ascending 
The potential options per each FFS are placed in ‘Allocation 
Packs’. Generating a random allocation in Step 1 involves 
selecting a random option from each Allocation Pack and 
then combining them with the non-optional allocations from 
the reduction stage, as mentioned earlier. Sorting the 
generated allocations for the next iteration means that after 
each iteration, the lowest cost — and ideally non-Tabu or 
aspiring — choice out of the produced candidates will have 
been made. To check if a candidate is Tabu, the fixed-size 
Tabu Tenure is parsed to see if there’s an identical allocation 
on it. If so, the subject allocation is not allowed. An 
allocation is considered aspiring if its cost is lower than each 
member of the Tabu Tenure. Thanks to the sorting of the list 
in Step 4ii, a simple comparison with the first entry in the list 
is only needed. 
To produce the next set of alternative allocations, the process 
described in the following algorithm is performed: 
1) Add into list Optional all ‘optional’ partial allocations 
2) Add into list IncreasableNonOptional all ‘non-optional’ 
partial allocations of DAL lower than 4 
3) For every partial allocation in the 
IncreasableNonOptional list, 
a) Select a random Allocation Pack affecting that 
partial allocation 
b) Select a random partial allocation from that Pack 
which assigns a higher DAL than the current one 
c) If none exist, continue to the next partial allocation 
d) Else, use that selection to generate a new allocation 
and add it to the resulting list 
e) Repeat 
4) For every partial allocation in the Optional list, 
a) Select a random Allocation Pack affecting that 
partial allocation 
b) Select a random partial allocation from that Pack 
which alters the current allocation 
c) Use that selection to generate a new allocation and 
add it to the resulting list 
d) Repeat 
5) Return the resulting list 
Note that steps 3 and 4 of the above algorithm are almost 
(except for sub-steps b and c) identical — simply applied to a 
different list. The purpose of the two lists is to find all partial 
allocations due to options taken from Allocation Packs which 
can be altered. Sub-step b) illustrates the difference between 
the two lists. In Optional, any partial allocation which alters 
the current allocation can be selected, whereas in the 
IncreasableNonOptional list we can only choose a partial 
allocation, if any exist, which increases the DAL of the 
resulting allocation.  
3. CASE STUDY: AIRCRAFT WHEEL-BRAKING 
SYSTEM 
Our case study is based on an example aircraft wheel braking 
system from ARP4761 (S-18, SAE, 1996), adapted by 
(Sharvia & Papadopoulos, 2011). The system is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The purpose of the system is to provide safe 
braking during aircraft takeoff and landing. It features two 
primary hydraulic pumps, GreenPump and BluePump. The 
Brake System Control Unit (BSCU) forwards input from the 
brake pedals to the brakes, monitors input systems and states 
for correctness and provides feedback to other systems. The 
SelectorValve receives a constant stream of pressure from 
both pumps, relaying the pressure from the appropriate one to 
the corresponding meter valve. The anti-skid meter valves 
(ASMeterValveG and ASMeterValveB) output the required 
amount of pressure based on BSCU’s commands. The system 
features two modes of operation, Normal and Alternate. In 
Normal mode, GreenPump is used, sending pressure through 
the SelectorValve to ASMeterValveG. In Alternate mode, 
BluePump is used to send pressure through the SelectorValve 
to ASMeterValveB. Alternate mode is activated by BSCU 
when the pressure output falls under a certain threshold in 
Normal mode. 
If braking fails during takeoff or landing, consequences could 
be catastrophic. The plane could fail to decelerate as expected 
on landing, or brake during take-off, potentially causing a 
severe accident. We found this reasoning sufficient to test the 
allocation by assigning the overall DAL of the system output 
(WBS) to be A. We should note that this assignment is 
  
     
 
primarily used as an example and in practice the actual DAL 
assignment could be lower. However, this would not impact 
the allocation process described; a lower allocation can only 
potentially lead to a smaller number of potential allocations 
that need to be evaluated. Therefore, in this sense, we are 
demonstrating the worst case scenario with regards to the 
number of potential candidates that need to be evaluated. For 
the purposes of the case study, the costs in Table 5 were used 
to approximate the cost each DAL would have on its 
component. 
Table 5. Item DAL Cost 
DAL A = 4 B = 3 C = 2 D = 1 E = 0 
Cost 50 40 20 10 0 
 
The resulting allocation when the parent FC (WBS) is 
assigned with DAL A can be seen in Fig. 1. (DALs from A to 
E numbered from 4 to 0 respectively). 
 
Fig. 1. Allocation of DALs on model. 
The allocation algorithm was executed numerous times, each 
time producing a permutation of the allocation shown above 
or the one displayed with the same overall DAL cost. This 
allocation was found to be optimal after exhaustively 
enumerating all possible combinations of DAL allocations for 
this model. It should be noted that this was only possible due 
to the relative small scale of the search space (531,441 
possible allocations). Larger-scale models might require 
excessively long periods of time to exhaustively search for 
their optimal solutions. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In the aerospace industry, dissemination of safety 
requirements across the system’s architecture is a 
fundamental part of the safety development process described 
in ARP4754A. Applying the guidance of the standard is 
challenging as an increase to the number of components 
within a system results in a super-linear growth of the 
number of allocation options that need to be evaluated. 
Furthermore, finding a trivial allocation manually would not 
be ideal, as each allocation has a different impact on 
development costs. Therefore, there is a significant incentive 
in determining the optimal allocation automatically and in 
this paper we have described a method and tool to achieve 
this. We have demonstrated that it is possible to allocate 
DALs to a given system architecture automatically, optimally 
and efficiently by applying this method to an example 
system. This development suggests that the possibility of 
automation of safety development processes is common to 
multiple standards and we feel confident that further 
automation is possible in this direction. Reflecting on the 
implementation of the Tabu Search, we believe it could be 
improved by including midterm and long-term memory 
structures, which would allow models with larger FFSs to 
have their DALs allocated more effectively. Additionally, 
although Tabu Search has proven to be an effective meta-
heuristic in solving the problem, other optimization 
techniques could be evaluated to compare their efficiency, as 
indicated in relevant work described in (Bieber, et al., 2011). 
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